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Facebook, the Conservatives, and the risk to fair and open elections in the 
UK 
 
In the UK 2015 election the Liberal Democrats lost 49 of their 57 seats. In the 
south-west of England, an area that had been core to their support, they lost all 
14 of their seats. Every one of these fourteen was won by the Conservatives. The 
LibDems were stunned by the scale of their defeat. Until the eve of the election, 
the Party leadership was hopeful of holding their ground, particularly in places 
like Yeovil and Thornbury and Yate where they held majorities of over 7,000. ‘My 
hunch’, then LibDem leader Nick Clegg told the Today Programme on 5th May, ‘is 
that we’re going to do much better than people think’.1 ‘Our vote may be a bit 
down on where we were last time’, Vince Cable told the Financial Times, though 
high enough, he thought, to negotiate a place in a coalition.2 
 
The Liberal Democrats knew that their current coalition partners, the 
Conservatives, were aiming to win some of their seats but, excepting the deluge 
of direct mail, there were few visible signs of them on the ground. As Nick Clegg, 
then leader of the Lib Dems told journalist and writer Tim Ross: 
 
‘We didn’t see any canvassers out on the streets. We would send out 
teams of canvassers, in the old ‘shoe-leather’ way. And you just wouldn’t 
see [the Tories], which is why in some significant parts it did completely 
blindside us. We knew they were firing off huge numbers of letters at folk 
but by definition we couldn’t see how the communication with voters was 
happening’.3 
 
In fact, according to Ross, the Conservatives had pursued a ruthless 
defenestration approach in the south-west. Named the ‘black-widow strategy’ – 
because black widow spiders sometimes eat their partners after mating with 
them – the Conservatives had decided by early 2014 to target their Coalition 
partners, especially in south-west England. Central to their approach was a 
highly strategic use of digital media. Much of this was to be targeted directly to 
constituents via social media and email, making it virtually invisible to the 
Liberal Democrats, and indeed to most of the public. 
 
The Conservative’s approach, and its success, shows not only how central social 
media – most notably Facebook – had become to their campaign communication 
by the UK 2015 election, but how this communication may be compromising the 
principles of fair and open elections in the UK. Its use and apparent success also 
suggests that existing electoral legislation and regulation are fast becoming 
outdated and un-policeable. 
 
Facebook was too new to play an influential part in a UK general election before 
2010. In May 2005, the previous UK general election, the company was just over 
a year old. It was in the US, where Facebook was established, that the social 
network was first used extensively in elections, particularly from the 2008 
presidential election.4 In 2008 Barack Obama recruited Chris Hughes, one of the 
original founders of Facebook, to his campaign strategy team. Obama then used 
the platform to help organize his campaign, and posted over a hundred times to 
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the site.5 In total, about a hundred campaign staff worked on different aspects of 
Obama’s social media outreach in 2008 – using a combination of Facebook, 
Twitter, Flickr, and MySpace.6 Yet Facebook was only one of a number of 
equivalent platforms at the time, with 21 million registered members in 2007, as 
compared to 1.5 billion worldwide by 2015.7 Still, by the close of the 2008 
campaign Obama had managed to build up more than 2.3 million Facebook 
supporters.8 
 
Despite the Obama campaign’s use of Facebook and other social media in 2008, 
most UK political parties still viewed these communications platforms as 
relatively minor aspects of their campaign activities in the 2010 general election. 
Facebook was used mainly to push out communication through Party fan pages, 
and to direct people to the Parties’ websites, even though by then it had 25 
million active UK users: 
 
‘Social media were important [in 2010], say the Tories, but mainly in 
creating ‘buzz,’ due to the reflected impact in the mainstream media. With 
votes to be won, a key strategy was to use marketing, along with organic 
and paid search to drive people to their website where they could lay out 
their wares’.9 
 
Craig Elder, who had been deputy head of digital during the Conservative’s 2010 
campaign, said the Party saw social media as more of a gimmick then a serious 
tool. ‘In the 2010 campaign, we wanted to show people we were smart and 
clever… We wanted to show them shiny things’.10 Facebook was more likely to 
be used as an organizing tool by Conservative Party activists, for example, than 
as a core part of the campaign.11 According to spending records submitted to the 
Electoral Commission, the Conservative Party did not spend anything on 
Facebook leading up to the 2010 election. 
 
By 2012, digital media had become central to the US presidential campaign 
strategies of both the main parties, particularly through the use of data analytics 
and behavioral modeling to personalize messages to specific voters in key 
locations.12 The Democratic party employed 100 full time ‘data scientists’, as 
compared to 12 in 2008. ‘We are going to measure every single thing in this 
campaign’ Jim Messina said after he was appointed by Obama to run the 
campaign.13 Facebook and social media played an integral part in delivering 
personalized messages to particular voters, and in capturing those voters’ 
responses. 
 
In 2015 the Conservatives were catching up, learning directly from those 
involved in the US presidential campaigns of 2008 and 2012, and working closely 
with Facebook to understand how best to use the platform. Jim Messina, Obama’s 
campaign manager, was brought in as Conservative campaign strategy advisor. 
Messina and other members of the Conservative campaign team then worked 
with elections specialists at Facebook to integrate the social network to their 
campaign strategy. 
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The stark difference between the Conservative campaigns of 2010 and 2015 is 
best illustrated by the contrast in the Party’s spending on Facebook. Having not 
spent any money on Facebook for the 2010 election, during the year leading to 
the 2015 election (the regulated period) the Conservative Party spent 
£1,209,593 on the social network’s services. The Party spent just under half of 
this between June and December 2014, and the rest from January till June 2015. 
It paid Facebook £439,981 from March 2015 through the election (the official 
campaign began when Parliament was dissolved on 30th March). By comparison, 
the Labour Party spent £16,455 with Facebook on the UK 2015 election, the 
Liberal Democrats £22,245, UKIP £91,322, and the Green Party £21,295 
(Electoral Commission). 
 
One of the great advantages of Facebook, from a political communications 
perspective, is that messages can be targeted not just at particular types of 
people, but at particular geographic areas. Facebook gives advertisers the option 
of focusing advertising to within a 10-mile radius. The largest UK constituency is 
about 7,500 square miles (Ross, Skye and Lochaber), the smallest between four 
and five square miles (Jeremy Corbyn’s constituency - Islington North). Parties 
can therefore choose to target individuals based not just on their demographics, 
their connections, their attitudes and their online behavior, but by their 
Parliamentary constituency, even by areas within particular constituencies. Since 
more than half the UK population were active Facebook users by 2015, this 
provided a particularly powerful channel to the electorate. 
 
During 2014, some of Conservative Facebook spending was targeted at 
constituency by-elections. We know this because the constituencies are named 
on the Facebook invoices. Newark, where a by-election was held on 5th June 
2014, was cited in four line items in the June invoice, totaling £1,720.18. The 
Party then spent £924.83 on the Clacton by-election, held in October 2014, and 
£3,599.52 on Rochester and Strood, where a by-election was held on 20 
November 2014. 
 
This focus on particular constituencies fit closely with the general election 
campaign strategy of the Conservative Party. In the autumn of 2012 the 
Conservatives had identified 80-100 key constituencies they wanted to target 
and those they wanted to defend. This became the ‘40/40’ strategy – 40 to attack 
and 40 to defend.14 If successful they hoped this would raise their number of 
seats from 306 to 326 (they eventually won 331). Over the following two years 
the Party carefully surveyed these seats to understand their demographics, 
political sensibilities, political allegiances and propensity to vote. This 
information was then fed into the Conservative election canvassing database - 
‘VoteSource’ - and later used to work out which voters to concentrate on and 
what issues and messages resonated best with them. 
 
By the end of 2014 the Conservatives had distilled these 80-plus constituencies 
down to 23 seats that, if won, could swing the election. The Telegraph reported 
that all but two of these seats were in the LibDems heartland, the south-west of 
England (the list of 23 seats published by The Telegraph does not include 
Thornbury and Yate or Yeovil, even though Conservative candidates in those 
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seats said they were one of the 23).15 The candidates themselves were conscious 
that their seat was one of the 23. Yeovil is ‘one of just 23 seats we need to win’ 
Conservative candidate Marcus Fysh posted on Facebook on 5th May. ‘We, the 
Conservatives are only 23 seats nationally from a majority and Torbay is one of 
those seats’, Kevin Foster posted on 4th May. ‘Thornbury and Yate is one of just 
23 more seats that David Cameron needs to win to form a majority government’ 
Luke Hall posted on the day of the election. 
 
Once the party had identified and surveyed its target seats, Facebook then 
provided two critical campaign functions. The social network provided a means 
by which to channel tailored, pre-tested messages to particular people in each 
constituency. It also provided a way in which to capture people’s reaction to 
those messages. As the Conservatives digital director for the campaign, Craig 
Elder, explained: 
 
‘We were able to work with Facebook using constituency targeting to 
focus just on the constituencies that were going to decide the election, 
and then based on what we already know about the demographics of the 
people who are going to decide this election, we could do demographic 
targeting, and interest targeting, to focus in on people and present 
different content to a young mum in Derby North to maybe a slightly 
older gentleman living in Rochester’.16 
 
Elder’s colleague and fellow 2015 campaign digital director, Tom Edmunds, 
reiterated this when speaking about the campaign in late May 2015: 
 
‘Targeted activity on Facebook and other platforms was focused on 
reaching undecided voters in marginal constituencies with the right 
messages’.17  
 
These messages often gave users the opportunity to find out more information, 
such as ‘How much might you save in tax cuts under the Conservatives?’ If they 
recipient wanted to find out, they needed to provide their email address and 
postcode. Armed with the email address and postcode, the Party could then 
contact the person directly with a personalised email, or direct mail, or even a 
knock at the door. This, according to Jim Messina, was what the Party then did, 
with increasing frequency as the campaign wore on: 
 
‘We [the Conservatives] were having as many as eight to ten 
conversations with undecided voters in the final week’.18 
 
Facebook was ‘the crucial weapon’ according to Messina. It enabled the forensic 
targeting of key undecided voters in swing seats. ‘I think the proof is in the 
pudding’, Messina said, ‘that we now hold every single west UK Lib Dem seat’.19 
After the Conservatives’ victory Craig Elder said ‘Facebook is a phenomenal 
campaigning platform and we really, really exploited that’.20 
 
Yet, though we know Facebook was critical, though we know it was targeted at 
specific undecided voters in marginal constituencies, and though we know it cost 
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a lot of money, we do not know how much it cost to target each constituency or 
what was communicated to which individual voters. 
 
Up to November 2014, constituencies are named in the invoices from Facebook – 
Newark in May 2014, Clacton in September 2014 and Rochester and Strood in 
October and November 2014. Yet, from February 2015 the invoices are 
effectively anonymised. Each invoice lists a numbered campaign – Campaign 01, 
Campaign 02 and so on – with a cost attached. It is therefore impossible to 
connect these to individual constituencies. 
 
The reason this is important, in a British context, is because of the UK’s strict 
limits on constituency spending, in order to ensure fairness. Fairness is one of 
the distinguishing characteristics of British election campaigns. There have been 
limits on the amount candidates can spend in an election campaign since the 
passing of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act in 1883. Though these 
laws have been adapted over the last century, and the amounts candidates are 
able to spend have changed, the principle remains the same. It is a principle that 
distinguishes the British system from other democracies, such as that of the US, 
and that is credited with limiting the influence of money in UK politics. It also 
enables smaller parties and independent candidates to challenge larger parties 
and incumbents. The importance of these limits for maintaining a level financial 
playing field has been reemphasised recently by research showing a positive link 
between spending at a constituency level and votes – in other words, higher 
spending has been shown to lead to more votes.21 
 
In 2015 each constituency candidate was legally allowed to spend around 
£15,000 during the short campaign (the exact amount varied depending on the 
size and spread of the constituency). This is separate to the amount that could be 
spent nationally, which was much larger. All but two of the Conservative 
candidates in the 14 constituencies in the south-west spent close to their 
spending limits.1 In Thornbury and Yate, Luke Hall declared £13,128, 90 per cent 
of the limit. In Yeovil Marcus Fysh declared 92 per cent of the limit of £16,120. In 
Torbay, Kevin Foster also declared 92 per cent of the limit of £13,281.  
 
Constituency spending is considered separately from national spending. National 
spending includes money spent on each party’s national campaign organisation 
and staff (including Lynton Crosby and the Conservative campaign team based at 
No.4 Matthew Parker Street), national billboard and press advertisements, 
general direct mail (i.e. not specific to a constituency candidate), rallies, and 
market research. There have been national spending limits for the year prior to 
an election since the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act was passed 
in 2000.  
 
The Conservatives spent the most nationally in 2015, a total of £15.6 million. 
£4.7 million of this went on opinion polling, and £4.3 million went on direct mail. 
                                                        
1 12 of the 14 candidates spent over 85% of their spending limit for the short campaign. The 
candidates for Bath and for Mid Dorset and North Poole spent 82% and 69% of their limit 
respectively 
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Labour spent a total of £12.1 million, the Liberal Democrats £3.5 million, and 
UKIP £2.9 million.  
 
The amount spent by the Conservatives on Facebook, £1.2 million between June 
2014 and June 2015, was counted as national expenditure, not constituency 
expenditure. Kevin Foster, for example, the Conservative candidate for Torbay, 
did not include any Facebook expenses in his constituency spending returns 
(based spending return details provided by Torbay Council). This was 
presumably because Facebook was treated by the Party like a national billboard 
and press advertising campaign, and because the communications distributed 
via Facebook for the 2015 election were about the national party rather than the 
local candidate. 
 
However, a national billboard and press advertising campaign is necessarily 
aimed at a broad swathe of voters, even if it is placed within certain 
constituencies, rather than individually targeted. Moreover, parties cannot, with 
national advertising campaigns, track who sees an ad, who reacts to it, or who 
responds to it directly. Nor can they then engage in a dialogue via the same 
channel. A national advertising campaign is also, by its nature, an open 
campaign, the claims of which can be widely assessed and challenged. 
 
By contrast, a social media campaign via Facebook is targeted at specific 
individuals within particular constituencies. The advertiser, in this case the 
Conservative party, can see who is exposed to its communication, how they 
react, and capture any personal information provided in response (email 
address, postcode, salary for example). They can then contact the person 
directly, via social media or email, to seek to persuade them. Equally, while it is 
possible to test a claim that national billboard or press advertising is about the 
national Party not the candidate, it is not possible to test a similar claim about 
Facebook advertising since this is opaque to all but the recipient. 
 
When communications are targeted at individuals within constituencies, leading 
subsequently to an ongoing dialogue with some of those individuals with the aim 
of persuading them to vote for the Conservative candidate in that constituency, it 
seems peculiar to define this as national rather than as constituency spending. 
Moreover, since the communications are opaque to anyone but the Party, the 
recipient and Facebook, then it is not possible to confirm whether or not they 
refer to the national party or to an individual candidate. 
 
Were the costs of Facebook to be allocated to the constituencies at which 
communication was targeted, it would significantly alter the spending returns 
for those constituencies. If the amount spent during the period of the long 
campaign (from 19 December 2014 to 29 March 2015) was allocated to the 
Conservatives 80 key constituencies, for example, it would add over £3,000 to 
each of their spending returns. If, during the period of the short campaign (from 
30th March to 7th May) it was allocated to the 23 most important marginals then 
it would add over £9,000 to each of their returns. This would raise each of the 
constituencies above the regulated spending limit. These figures are, of course, 
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theoretical since we do not know at which constituencies and constituents the 
communication was targeted. 
 
The Electoral Commission’s guidelines do not help to clarify the use of social 
media or its cost allocation. In the Commission’s July 2015 post-mortem on the 
administration of the general election, it acknowledged that there were, and still 
are, no specific rules regarding the use of social media by parties. Yet any 
regulated spending, it said, ‘on social media advertising would be subject to 
existing spending limits and reportable after the election’. This does not address 
the question of microtargeting or explain whether such spending should be 
allocated locally or nationally. The report notes the widespread use of social 
media by the parties, but rather than proposing changes to existing legislation or 
guidelines to take account of these, simply suggests keeping an eye on 
electioneering methods as they progress further: ‘As use of social media evolves,’ 
the report says, ‘it will be important to monitor changing campaigning 
techniques’.22 
 
This wait-and-see approach of the Commission risks ignoring an identifiable and 
growing structural problem with election expenditure. By allocating social media 
spending such as Facebook to the national returns a political party can campaign 
at a constituency level without adding to the constituency spending total. It can, 
in effect, bypass constituency spending limits. Since existing legislation makes no 
reference to social media or digital campaigning it would be difficult to say such 
activity is in breach of the existing law. However, if the purpose of the law is to 
maintain fairness in constituency contests, and prevent one party from 
outspending others at a constituency level, then such activity cannot but 
undermine this. 
 
The extensive use of social media to target individual constituents also 
compromises the openness of election communications. Electoral legislation 
obliges candidates and parties to be transparent about the provenance of any 
printed material they send to citizens (Representation of the People Act 1983: 
110). This way the public can assess who is saying what. The same legislation 
makes it illegal to make false claims in political communication (ibid. 1983: 106). 
Both these are undermined by targeted communication that goes directly to the 
recipient and cannot be seen, or challenged, by others. It is very hard for other 
parties, the public, or the electoral regulator, to check the provenance of, or 
claims made, in such opaque communication. 
 
Justin Fisher, writing about party finance shortly after the election, suggested 
that there ‘has always been a blurred line between’ constituency and national 
spending.23 Yet, given the growing individualization of campaign 
communications, and the ever greater emphasis by Parties on key seats, this line 
seems increasingly arbitrary and likely to become still more so given the 
opportunities for data collection and personalization. This is certainly the 
direction of US elections.24 
 
There are many reasons why the Liberal Democrats lost more than 8 out of 10 of 
their seats in the 2015 election. The party lost its outside outsider status when it 
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joined the Coalition in 2010. In government it compromised on issues it had 
previously campaigned on, such as tuition fees. Within seven months of joining 
the Conservatives in office the LibDems poll rating was down to 8%, and hardly 
rose thereafter.25 As the LibDem support declined, that of UKIP, the Green Party 
and the SNP all increased. 
 
Yet the Liberal Democrats were also far less well-funded than Labour or the 
Conservatives, able to spend less than a quarter of what the Conservatives were 
able to spend at a national level. It was thanks to this additional funding, from a 
national level, that the Conservatives were able to spend £1.2m on Facebook. 
Much of this Facebook spending went on targeted campaigns towards specific 
constituencies and constituents. Many of these constituencies were previously 
held by the LibDems. In May 2015 they were won by the Conservatives. 
 
Based on the experience of the UK 2015 election it is becoming increasingly clear 
that the failure of existing electoral legislation and guidelines to take digital 
media – and particularly social media – into account, jeopardises the fairness and 
openness of UK elections. 
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